



# Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR)

## भारतीय दूरसंचार सुरक्षा आश्वासन आवश्यकताएँ (भा.दू.सु.आ.आ.)

### L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch (Draft for Comments)

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## About NCCS

National Centre for Communication Security (NCCS), with headquarters at Bengaluru was set up in 2018 with the objective to establish and operationalize a framework of security testing and certification within the country. NCCS is mandated to prepare Telecom security requirements/standards called Indian Telecommunication Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR) that addresses the country specific security needs in telecommunication landscape and notify the same.



## Document History

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## A) Outline

The objective of this document is to present comprehensive, country-specific security requirements for Ethernet Switches. Ethernet Switches are network devices used for forwarding frames within a network, enabling efficient data communication across multiple devices. They play a critical role in TSP and ISP networks, enterprise networks, and other environments, functioning as Access Switches, Aggregation Switches, and Core Switches. Ethernet Switches facilitate Layer 2 and Layer 3 connectivity, supporting a variety of features such as VLAN segmentation, Quality of Service (QoS), and advanced security policies.

The specifications developed by various regional/international standardization bodies/organizations/associations like ETSI, ENISA, 3GPP, Telecommunications Standards Development Society of India (TSDSI), etc., along with the country-specific security requirements, form the foundation of this document. Refs to the Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC)/TSDSI imply that the respective clause has been adopted as-is or with certain modifications.

This document commences with a brief overview of switches, the various types of switches, and their functionalities. It then proceeds to address the common and entity-specific security requirements applicable to Ethernet Switches.

## B) Scope

This document targets the security requirements of Ethernet Switches. It applies to all types of Ethernet Switches, including but not limited to: Conventional Switches (modular and fixed), Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based Switches, Cloud-Native Switches (CNF), Virtual Switches (VNF), Cloud-Managed Switches and disaggregated switches. The applicability spans across all deployment roles, such as Access Switches, Aggregation Switches, Core Switches, and Data Center Switches. All clauses are universally applicable to all types of Ethernet Switches unless explicitly stated otherwise. Additionally, all CSR clauses shall extend to relevant components of Ethernet Switch implementations, including but not limited to VNF/CNF, NFVI, SDN controllers, APIs, Layer 2/3 protocols, and other related entities, wherever applicable.

Furthermore, any clause specified for IPv4 shall also apply to IPv6.

## C) Conventions

1. Must or shall or required denotes the absolute requirement of a particular clause of ITSAR.
2. Must not or shall not denote absolute prohibition of a particular clause of ITSAR.
3. Should or recommended denotes that a particular clause of ITSAR may be ignored under justifiable circumstances but after careful examination of its implications.
4. Should not or not Recommended denotes the opposite meaning of (3) above.




# Chapter 1: Overview

## 1.1 Introduction

A network switch is essential for connecting multiple devices within a local area network (LAN), allowing them to communicate efficiently. It directs data between devices by forwarding packets based on MAC addresses, minimizing traffic, and improving performance. LAN switches also manage collision domains, support VLANs for network segmentation, and can include Layer 3 functionality for inter-VLAN routing. Modern LAN switches enhance security with features like ACLs and port security, and many provide Power over Ethernet (PoE) for powering devices.

Network LAN switches come in various models, designed to meet different networking needs and environments.




**Fig.1: Layer2 & Layer 3 Architecture**

- i. **Layer 2 switches**, operating at the Data Link layer of the OSI model, forward data based on MAC addresses, enhancing network performance by minimizing collisions. Unlike hubs, each LAN switch port creates an independent collision domain, allowing simultaneous, interference-free communication. With hardware-based processing, Layer 2 LAN switches ensure fast frame forwarding and low latency. They also support VLANs, enabling logical network segmentation while maintaining efficient data flow. By learning connected devices' MAC addresses and building a forwarding table, these LAN switches intelligently direct traffic, reducing unnecessary transmissions and boosting

network security, performance, and scalability

- ii. Layer 3 switches** operate at the Network layer of the OSI model, blending the functions of LAN switches with the routing capabilities needed for inter-VLAN communication and efficient traffic management. They route traffic between VLANs and subnets using IP addresses, unlike Layer 2 switches that rely on MAC addresses. By inspecting packet headers, Layer 3 switches determine optimal data paths and support routing protocols, ensuring dynamic updates and improved reliability. These LAN switches isolate broadcast domains per port, reducing broadcast storms and enhancing security. With features like policy-based routing and ACLs, they offer advanced traffic control, making them ideal for large, complex networks requiring efficient inter-VLAN routing and robust management.
- iii. Data Center switches:** Designed for high-speed data centers with large-scale operations, offering low latency, high throughput, and support for features like RDMA and VXLAN. Data centers and cloud service providers need high-performance networking.
- iv. Cloud-native switches** are network devices designed specifically for integration with cloud-native architectures, leveraging containerization, microservices, and orchestration platforms like Kubernetes. These switches are built to seamlessly manage and optimize traffic in dynamic, cloud-centric environments where applications and workloads are distributed across on-premises, private, and public clouds. Unlike traditional switches, cloud-native switches operate with deep programmability, using APIs to interact with cloud orchestration tools. They support automation frameworks, enabling dynamic provisioning, scaling, and configuration adjustments to accommodate changes in application demands. Technologies such as EVPN-VXLAN, SRv6, and SDN-based traffic steering are often integrated to facilitate seamless network overlays, high scalability, and multi-tenant isolation



**Fig. 2: Cloud-native Architecture**

- v. **SDN based Cloud-managed Switch:** In a conventional switch, the switch has its own data plane and control plane. The control plane exchanges topology information (control plane traffic) and constructs a forwarding table that decides where an incoming data packet must be forwarded via the data plane. In an SDN switch, the control plane is separated from the forwarding plane and is implemented in a centralized unit called the SDN controller. The O&M plane is also installed in a centralized location. The centralized function is typically implemented as a VNF. Network administrators can manage and shape traffic via a centralized console without having to configure individual switches. CUPS switches are a special case of SDN switches.

SDN-based switches are network devices that allow centralized management and configuration through a cloud-based platform. These switches simplify network operations by enabling remote monitoring, updates, and troubleshooting via a web interface or mobile app. Designed for scalability and ease of use, they provide advanced features such as VLANs, QoS, and security settings, often integrated with analytics and automation capabilities.

- vi. **OpenFlow-enabled Switches:** These switches support the OpenFlow protocol, which allows an SDN controller to manage the data plane and make forwarding decisions dynamically. OpenFlow is commonly used in SDN deployments to centralize control and simplify network management.
- vii. **CUPS Switches:** As part of the SDN architecture, these switches separate the control and user planes. Typically used in mobile core networks, they optimize performance and scalability by centralizing control while distributing the user plane





Fig. 3A: SDN based Switch Architecture



**Fig. 3B: SDN Via Hypervisor**

**viii. Virtual switches:** Enabling Network Connectivity in Virtualized Environments: Virtual switches are software-based networking devices that replicate the functionality of physical network switches within virtualized environments. They facilitate communication between virtual machines (VMs) on the same host or across different hosts in a data centre. By connecting the virtual network interfaces (vNICs) of VMs, virtual switches enable seamless interaction between VMs and the external physical network. Operating at Layer 2 of the OSI model, they manage traffic forwarding based on MAC addresses, similar to physical switches. Virtual switches forward Ethernet frames based on MAC addresses and can be configured with features like VLAN tagging, traffic isolation, and security policies. Commonly used in hypervisor environments such as VMware vSphere, Microsoft Hyper-V, or KVM, they ensure seamless networking between virtualized resources while maintaining scalability and flexibility in network management. As critical components in modern virtualized network infrastructures, virtual switches facilitate efficient communication and traffic isolation while providing robust features such as security, load balancing, and failover. With the growing adoption of hypervisors and cloud-based technologies, their role has expanded, offering enhanced management, scalability, and network performance in multi-host and multi-tenant environments.




Fig.4: Virtual switch Architecture



## Chapter 2: Common Security Requirements

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### Section 2.1: Access and Authorization

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#### 2.1.1 Authentication for Product Management and Maintenance interfaces

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support mutual authentication of entities on management interfaces. The authentication mechanism can rely on the management protocols used for the interface or other means.

Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document “Indian Telecommunication Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR) for Cryptographic Controls” shall only be used for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch management and maintenance.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.4.1]

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#### 2.1.2 Management Traffic Protection

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch management traffic (information exchanged during interactions with OAM) shall be protected strictly using secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document “ITSAR For Cryptographic Controls” only.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.2.4]

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#### 2.1.3 Role-Based access control policy

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support Role Based Access Control (RBAC). A role-based access control system shall use a set of controls which determines how users interact with domains and resources. The domains could be Fault Management (FM), Performance Management (PM), System Admin, etc. The RBAC system shall control how users or groups of users are allowed access to the various domains and what type of operation they can perform, i.e. the specific operation command or command group (e.g. View, Modify, Execute).

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support RBAC with minimum of 3 user roles, in particular, for OAM privilege management for network product Management and Maintenance, including authorization of the operation for configuration data and software via the network product console interface. The RBAC shall be applicable to API users also.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.6.2]

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#### 2.1.4 User Authentication – Local/Remote



**Requirement:**

The various user and machine accounts on a system shall be protected from misuse. To this end, an authentication attribute shall be used, which, when combined with the username, shall enable unambiguous authentication and identification of the authorized user. Authentication attributes include.

- Cryptographic keys
- Token
- Passwords

This means that authentication based on a parameter that can be spoofed (e.g. phone numbers, public IP addresses or VPN membership) shall not be permitted. Exceptions are attributes that cannot be faked or spoofed by an attacker.

Minimum two of the above Authentication attributes shall be mandatorily combined for protecting all the accounts from misuse in public network environment. An exception to this requirement is local access and machine accounts where at least one authentication attribute shall be supported.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.2.1]

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**2.1.5 Remote login restrictions for privileged users****Requirement:**

Login to L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch as root or equivalent highest privileged user shall be limited to the system console only. Root user shall not be allowed to login to L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch remotely. This remote root user access restriction is also applicable to application software's / tools such as TeamViewer, desktop sharing which provide remote access to the L2 and (or) L3 LAN switch.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.3.2.6]

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**2.1.6 Authorization Policy****Requirement:**

The authorizations for accounts and applications shall be reduced to the minimum required for the tasks they have to perform.

Authorizations to L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be restricted to a level in which a user can only access data and use functions that he needs in the course of his work. Suitable authorizations shall also be assigned for access to files that are components of the operating system or of applications or that are generated by the same (e.g. configuration and logging files). Alongside access to data, execution of applications and components shall also take place with rights that are as low as possible. Applications should not be executed with administrator or system rights.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.6.1]

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**2.1.7 Unambiguous identification of the user & group accounts removal****Requirement:**

Users shall be identified unambiguously by the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support the assignment of individual accounts per user, where the user could be a person, or, for Machine Accounts, an application, or a system. LAN Switch shall not enable the use of group accounts or group credentials, or sharing of the same account between several users

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.1.2]

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## **Section 2.2: Authentication Attribute Management**

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### **2.2.1 Authentication Policy**

Requirement:

The usage of a system function without successful authentication, on the basis of the user identity and at least two authentication attributes shall be prevented. For machine accounts and local access one authentication attribute will be sufficient. System functions comprise, for example network services (like Secure Shell (SSH), Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), Web services), local access via a management console, local usage of operating system and applications. This requirement shall also be applied to accounts that are only used for communication between systems.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.1.1]

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### **2.2.2 Authentication Support – External**

Requirement:

If the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch supports external authentication mechanism such as AAA server (for authentication, authorization, and accounting services), then the communication between L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch and the external authentication entity shall be protected using the authentication and related service protocols built strictly using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document “ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls” only.

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### **2.2.3 Protection against brute force and dictionary attacks**

Requirement:

Protection against brute force and dictionary attacks that hinder authentication attribute (i.e. password) guessing shall be implemented.

Brute force and dictionary attacks aim to use automated guessing to ascertain passwords for user and machine accounts. Various measures or a combination of the following measures shall be taken to prevent this:

- i) Using the timer delay (this delay could be the same or increased depending on the operator's policy for each attempt) for each newly entered password input following an incorrect entry ("tar pit").
- ii) Blocking an account following a specified number of incorrect attempts. However, it has to be taken into account that this solution needs a process for unlocking as an attacker can force this to deactivate accounts and make them unusable.

- iii) Using CAPTCHA to prevent automated attempts (often used for Web applications).
- iv) Using a password blacklist to prevent vulnerable passwords.

In order to achieve higher security, two or more of the measures indicated above shall be mandatorily supported by L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.3.3]

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#### **2.2.4 Enforce Strong Password**

Requirement:

- a) The configuration setting shall be such that L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall only accept passwords that comply with the following complexity criteria:
  - i) Absolute minimum length of 8 characters (shorter lengths shall be rejected by the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch). It shall not be possible to set this absolute minimum length to a lower value by configuration.
  - ii) Password shall mandatorily comprise all the following four categories of characters:
    - 1) At least 1 uppercase character (A-Z)
    - 2) At least 1 lowercase character (a-z)
    - 3) At least 1 digit (0-9)
    - 4) At least 1 special character (e.g., @;!\$.)
- b) The minimum length of characters in the passwords and the set of allowable special characters shall be configurable by the operator. The special characters may be categorized in sets according to their Unicode category.
- c) If a central system is used for user authentication password policy, then additional assurance shall be provided that the central system enforces the same password complexity rules as laid down for the local system in this sub-clause.
- d) If a central system is not used for user authentication, the assurance on password complexity rules shall be performed on the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.
- e) When a user is changing a password or entering a new password, L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch /central system shall check and ensure that it meets the password requirements. Above requirements shall be applicable for all passwords used (e.g., application-level, OS-level, etc.).
- f) Passwords shall not be stored in clear text in the system; passwords shall be salted and hashed.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.3.1]

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#### **2.2.5 Inactive Session Timeout**

Requirement:

An OAM user interactive session shall be terminated automatically after a specified period of inactivity. It shall be possible to configure an inactivity time-out period. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall monitor inactive sessions of administrative login users and initiate session locking mechanism based on pre-configured timers. Unlocking the session shall be permissible only by user authentication. If the inactivity period further continues for a defined period, session/user ID timeout must occur after this inactivity. Re-authentication of the OAM user shall be repeated

following any period of inactivity lasting 15 minutes or longer.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.5.2]

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## 2.2.6 Password Changes

Requirement:

If a password is used as an authentication attribute, then the system shall offer a function that enables a user to change his password at any time. When an external centralized system for user authentication is used; it shall be possible to implement this function on this system.

Password change shall be enforced after initial login (after successful authentication).

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall enforce password change based on password management policy. In particular, the system shall enforce password expiry. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support a configurable period for expiry of passwords.

Previously used passwords shall not be allowed up to a certain number (Password History). The number of disallowed previously used passwords shall be:

- a) Configurable;
- b) Greater than 0;
- c) And its minimum value shall be 3. This means that the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall store at least the three previously set passwords. The maximum number of passwords that the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch can store for each user is up to the manufacturer.

When a password is about to expire, a password expiry notification shall be provided to the user.

Above requirements shall be applicable for all passwords used (e.g., application-level, OS level, etc.). An exception to this requirement is machine accounts.

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have an in-built mechanism to support this requirement. If a central system is used for user authentication password policy, then additional assurance shall be provided that the central system enforces the same password change policies as laid down for the local system in this sub-clause.

And if a central system is not used for user authentication, the assurance on password changes rules shall be performed on the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

The minimum password age shall be set as one day i.e., recycling or flipping of passwords to immediate return to favorite password is not possible.

The password shall be changed (need not be automatic) based on key events including, not limited to

- Indication of compromise (IoC)
- Change of user roles
- When a user leaves the organization

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.3.2]

[Ref: CIS\_Benchmarks\_Password\_Policy\_Guide\_v21.12]

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## 2.2.7 Protected Authentication feedback

Requirement:

The Authentication attributes shall not be displayed in such a way that it could be seen and misused

by a casual local observer. Typically, the individual characters of the password are replaced by a character such as "\*".

This requirement shall be applicable for all authentication attributes used (e.g. application- level, OS-level, etc.). An exception to this requirement is machine accounts

[Ref: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.3.4]

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## **2.2.8 Removal of predefined or default authentication attributes**

Requirement:

Predefined or default authentication attributes shall be deleted or disabled. Normally, authentication attributes such as password or cryptographic keys will be preconfigured from producer, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) or developer of a system. Such authentication attributes shall be changed by automatically forcing a user to change it on first time login to the system or the OEM provides instructions on how to manually change it.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 5.2.3.4.2.3]

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## **2.2.9 Logout Function**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have a function that allows a signed-in user to logout at any time. All processes under the logged-in user ID shall be terminated on logout. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be able to continue to operate without interactive sessions.

Only for debugging purposes, processes under a logged-in user ID may be allowed to continue to run after detaching the interactive session.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.5.1]

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## **2.2.10 Policy regarding consecutive failed login attempts**

Requirement:

- a) The maximum permissible number of consecutive failed user account login attempts shall be configurable by the operator. The definition of the default value set at manufacturing time for the maximum number of failed user account login attempts shall be less than or equal to 8, typically 5. After the maximum permissible number of consecutive failed user account login attempts is exceeded by a user, there shall be a block delay in allowing the user to attempt login again. This block delay and the capability to set the period of the block delay, e.g., double the delay, or 5 minutes delay, or 10 minutes delay, after each login failure should be configurable by the operator. The default value set at manufacturing time for this delay shall be greater than or equal to 5 sec.
- b) If supported, infinite (permanent) locking of an account that has exceeded the maximum

permissible number of consecutive failed user account login attempts shall also be possible via configuration, with the exception of administrative accounts, which shall get only temporarily locked.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.5]

### **2.2.11 Suspend accounts on non-use**

Requirement:

It shall be possible for the system to automatically suspend an account after 'X' days without a valid login.

Note: X may be specified by operator. It can be implemented centrally also.

[Ref: CIS Password Policy Guide]

## **Section 2.3: Software Security**

### **2.3.1 Secure Update**

Requirement:

- a) Software package integrity shall be validated during the software update stage.
- b) L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support software package integrity validation via cryptographic means, e.g., digital signature using Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only. To this end, the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have a list of public keys or certificates of authorized software sources, and uses the keys to verify that the software update originated from only these sources.
- c) Tampered software shall not be executed or installed if integrity check fails.
- d) A security mechanism is required to guarantee that only authorized user can initiate and deploy a software update and modify the list mentioned in (b) above.

Note: Code signing (valid and not time expired) is also allowed as an option in (b) above

Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.3.5]

### **2.3.2 Secure Upgrade**

Requirement:

- a) Software package integrity shall be validated during the software upgrade stage.
- b) L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support software package integrity validation via cryptographic means, e.g., digital signature using Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only. To this end, the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have a list of public keys or certificates of authorized software sources, and uses the keys to verify that the software upgrade originated from only these sources.
- c) Tampered software shall not be executed or installed if integrity check fails.
- d) A security mechanism shall be required to guarantee that only authorized users can initiate

and deploy a software upgrade and modify the list mentioned in (b) above.

Note: Code signing (valid and not time expired) is also allowed as an option in (b) above. [Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.3.5]

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### **2.3.3 Source code security assurance**

Requirement:

- i) OEM shall follow best security practices including secure coding for software development. Source code shall be made available either at Telecom Security Testing Laboratory (TSTL) premises or at the mutually agreed location for source code review by the designated TSTL. It shall be supported by furnishing the Software Test Document (STD).
- ii) Also, OEM shall submit the undertaking as below:
  - a. Industry standard best practices of secure coding have been followed during the entire development life cycle of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch software which includes OEM developed code, third party software and open-source code libraries used/embedded in the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch
  - b. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch software shall be free from Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) top 25, Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) top 10 security vulnerabilities and OWASP top 10 API Security vulnerabilities as on the date of latest release of product or three months prior to the date of offer of product for testing, whichever is latest. For security weaknesses, vulnerabilities identified or discovered during the interim period, OEM shall give mitigation plan.
  - c. The binaries for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch and upgrades/updates thereafter generated from the source code are free from all known security vulnerabilities stated in (ii) above.

[Ref: [https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022\\_cwe\\_top25.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25.html)] [Ref: <https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/>]  
[Ref: <https://owasp.org/www-project-api-security/>]

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### **2.3.4 Known Malware and backdoor Check**

Requirement:

OEM shall submit an undertaking stating that L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch is free from all known malware and backdoors as on the date of offer of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch to designated TSTL for testing and shall submit their internal Malware Test Document (MTD) of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch to the designated TSTL.

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### **2.3.5 No unused software**

Requirement:

Software components or parts of software which are not needed for operation or functionality of the

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not be present/configured. Orphaned software components /packages shall not be present in L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch. OEM shall provide the list of software that are necessary for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch's operation. In addition, OEM shall furnish an undertaking as "L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch does not contain software that is not used in the functionality of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch."

[Ref : TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.3.2.3]

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### 2.3.6 Unnecessary Service Removal

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall only run protocol handlers and services which are needed for its operation, and which do not have any known security vulnerabilities. In particular, by default the following services shall be initially configured to be disabled on L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch by the OEM except if services are needed during deployment. In that case those services shall be disabled according to OEM's instructions after deployment is done. Disabled protocols may still need to be enabled for other reasons by the operators, e.g., remote diagnostics.

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not support following services:

- a. File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
- b. Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
- c. Telnet
- d. rlogin, Rate Control Protocol (RCP), Remote Shell Protocol (RSH)
- e. HTTP
- f. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) v1 and v2
- g. SSHv1
- h. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) / User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Small Servers (Echo, Chargen, Discard and Daytime)
- i. Finger
- j. Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) server
- k. Discovery protocols (Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP), Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP))
- l. IP Identification Service (Identd)
- m. Packet Assembler/Disassembler (PAD)
- n. Maintenance Operations Protocol (MOP)

Any other protocols, services that are vulnerable are also shall be permanently disabled. Full documentation of required protocols and services (communication matrix) of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch and their purpose needs shall be provided by the OEM as prerequisite for the test case.

[Ref : TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.3.2.1]

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### 2.3.7 Restricting System Boot Source

Requirement:



The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall boot only from the memory devices intended for this purpose.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.3.2]

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### **2.3.8 Secure Time Synchronization**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall establish a secure communication channel through standard interface with the Network Time Protocol (NTP) / Precision Time Protocol (PTP) server as per appropriate TEC ER (essential requirement) document.

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall establish a secure communication channel strictly using Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" with NTP/PTP server. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall generate audit logs for all changes to time settings.

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support NTPv4 or later version to ensure secure time synchronization.

Note: RFC 8915 which proposes Network Time Security (NTS) as an extension field for the NTP version 4 is also permitted.

[Ref: RFC 5905]

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### **2.3.9 Restricted reachability of services**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall restrict the reachability of services so that they can only be reached on interfaces meant for the purpose. On interfaces where services are active, the reachability shall be limited to legitimate communication peers. This limitation shall be realized on the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch itself (without external measures e.g., firewall, at network side) according to the requirement detailed in section 2.7.1 Traffic Filtering. Administrative services (e.g., SSH, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)) shall be restricted to interfaces in the management plane to support separation of management traffic from user traffic.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.3.2.2]

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### **2.3.10 Self-Testing**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch's cryptographic module shall perform power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests to ensure that the module is functioning properly. Power-up self-tests shall be performed when the cryptographic module is powered up during System bootup/restart. Conditional self-tests shall be performed when an applicable security function or operation is invoked (i.e. security functions for which self-tests are required). If a cryptographic module fails a self-test, the module shall enter an error state and output an error indicator via the status output interface. The

cryptographic module shall not perform any cryptographic operations while in an error state.

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## **Section 2.4: System Secure Execution Environment**

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### **2.4.1 No unused functions**

Requirement:

Unused functions i.e. the software and hardware functions which are not needed for operation or functionality of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be permanently deactivated. Permanently means that they shall not be reactivated again after the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch's reboot. If unused functions of software cannot be deleted or uninstalled individually as required in clause "2.3.5 No unused software" of the present document, such functions shall be deactivated in the configuration of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch permanently.

The list of hardware and software functions installed in the system shall match with the ones that have been mentioned and deemed necessary for the operation of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

Example: A debugging function in software which can be used for troubleshooting shall not be activated during normal operation of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.3.2.4]

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### **2.4.2 No unsupported components**

Requirement:

OEM to ensure that the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not contain software and hardware components that are no longer supported by them or their 3rd Parties (e.g., vendor, producer or developer) including the opensource communities, such as components that have reached end-of-life or end-of-support. An undertaking in this regard shall be provided by OEM.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.3.2.5]

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### **2.4.3 Avoidance of Unspecified mode of Access**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not contain any access mechanism which is unspecified or not declared. An undertaking shall be given by the OEM as follows:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch does not contain any wireless, optical, magnetic or any other component that may be used as a covert channel.

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## **Section 2.5: User Audit**

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## 2.5.1 Audit trail storage and protection

Requirement:

The security event log of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switches shall be access controlled (file access rights), so only privilege users shall have access to read the log files but shall not be allowed to delete the log files. This requirement shall be applicable to Administrator also.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.3.6.3]

## 2.5.2 Audit Event Generation

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall log all security events with unique System references such as IP Address, MAC address, hostname, etc. It shall be possible to log the events as given in the table below. The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall record within each audit record at least information pertaining to Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event.

Additional audit record information, depending on the audit event, shall also be provided as given in the Table below:

Sr. No.	Event Types (Mandatory or Optional)	Description	Event data to be logged
1.	Incorrect login attempts (Mandatory)	Records any user's incorrect login attempts to the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch	Username
			Source (IP address) if remote access
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
2.	Administrator access (Mandatory)	Records any access attempts to accounts that have system privileges.	Username
			Timestamp
			Length of session
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)

			Source (IP address) if remote access
3.	Account administration (Mandatory)	Records all account administration activity, i.e. configure, delete, copy, enable, and disable.	Administrator username
			Administered account
			Activity performed (configure, delete, enable and disable)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
4.	Resource Usage (Mandatory)	Records events that have been triggered when system parameter values such as disk space, CPU load over a longer period have exceeded their defined thresholds.	Value exceeded
			Value reached
			(Here suitable threshold values shall be defined depending on the individual system.)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
5.	Configuration change (Mandatory)	Changes to configuration of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch	Change made
			Timestamp
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Username
6.	Reboot/shutdown/ crash (Mandatory)	This event records any action on the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch that forces a reboot or shutdown OR where the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch has crashed.	Action performed (boot, reboot, shutdown, etc.)
			Username (for intentional actions)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)

			Timestamp
7.	Interface status change (Mandatory)	Change to the status of interfaces on the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch (e.g., shutdown)	Interface name and type
			Status (shutdown, down, missing link, etc.)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
8.	Change of group membership or accounts (Mandatory)	Any change of group membership for accounts	Administrator username
			Administered account
			Activity performed (group added or removed)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
9.	Resetting Passwords (Mandatory)	Resetting of user account passwords by the Administrator	Administrator username
			Administered account
			Activity performed (configure, delete, enable and disable)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
10.	Services (Mandatory)	Starting and Stopping of Services (if applicable)	Service Identity
			Activity performed (start, stop, etc.)
			Timestamp
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
11.	X.509 Certificate	Unsuccessful attempt to	Timestamp

	Validation (Optional)	validate a certificate	Reason for failure
			Subject identity
			Type of event
12.	Secure update (Mandatory)	Attempt to initiate manual update, initiation of update, completion of update	User identity
			Timestamp
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Activity performed
13.	Time change (Mandatory)	Change in time settings	Old value of time
			New value of time
			Timestamp
			Origin of attempt to change time (e.g., IP address)
			Subject identity
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			User identity
14.	Session unlocking /Termination (Optional)	Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive session, termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism, termination of an interactive session	User identity (wherever applicable)
			Timestamp
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Subject identity
			Activity performed
			Type of event
15.	Trusted	Initiation, Termination and	Timestamp

	Communication paths with IT entities such as Authentication Server, Audit Server, NTP Server, etc. and for authorized remote administrators (Optional)	Failure of trusted Communication paths	Initiator identity (as applicable)
			Target identity (as applicable)
			User identity (in case of Remote administrator access)
			Type of event
			Outcome of event (Success or failure, as applicable)
16.	Audit data changes (Mandatory)	Changes to audit data including deletion of audit data	Timestamp
			Type of event (audit data deletion, audit data modification)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Subject identity
			User identity
			Origin of attempt to change time (e.g., IP address)
			Details of data deleted or modified
17.	User Login (Mandatory)	All use of Identification and authentication mechanisms.	User identity
			Origin of attempt (IP address)
			Outcome of event (Success or failure)
			Timestamp
18	Access Control Policy violations	Any failure of a packet to match an ACL rule allowing traversal of the switch	Date /Time stamps, The source, destination and protocol attributes of the Traffic

19	attempt to initiate manual software update, initiation of software update, completion of update	Logs generation	user identity, Timestamp, Outcome of event (Success or failure), Activity performed
20	All use of identification and authentication mechanism	All use of identification and authentication mechanism	user identity, origin of attempt (e.g.IP address), Timestamp, outcome of event (Success or failure)

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.6.1]

### 2.5.3 Secure Log Export

Requirement:

- a. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch should support (near real time) forwarding of security event logging data to an external system available in redundant configuration by push or pull mechanism through diverse links.
- b. Log functions shall support secure uploading of log files to a central location or to a system external for the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.
- c. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be able to store the generated audit/log data locally. The memory for this purpose shall be dimensioned to cater for the continuous storage of two days of audit/log data. OEM shall submit justification document for sufficiency of local storage requirement.
- d. Secure Log export shall comply with the secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only.

[Ref [3]: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.6.2]

## Section 2.6: Data Protection

### 2.6.1 Cryptographic Based Secure Communication

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall communicate with the connected entities strictly using the secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only.

OEM shall submit to TSTL, the list of the connected entities with L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch and the method of secure communication with each entity with details of interface, protocol stack implemented, configuration, detailed procedure of establishing communication with each entity and



any other details required for verifying this requirement.

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### **2.6.2 Cryptographic Module Security Assurance**

Requirement:

Cryptographic module embedded inside the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch (in the form of hardware, software or firmware) that provides all the necessary security services such as authentication, integrity and confidentiality is designed and implemented in compliance with FIPS 140-2 or later as prescribed by NIST standards.

Till further instructions, this clause will be considered 'complied' by submission of an undertaking by the OEM in specified format along with self-certified test reports. An undertaking is to be submitted by the OEM mentioning that "Cryptographic module embedded inside the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch (in the form of hardware, software or firmware) that provides all the necessary security services such as authentication, integrity and confidentiality is designed and implemented in compliance with FIPS 140-2 or later as prescribed by NIST standards."

[Ref : 1. ENISA Recommendation "Standardization in support of the cybersecurity certification", Dec 2019 2. <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf> ]

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### **2.6.3 Cryptographic Algorithms implementation Security Assurance**

Requirement:

Cryptographic algorithm implemented inside the Crypto module of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be in compliance with the respective latest FIPS standards (for the specific crypto algorithm). Till further instructions, this clause will be considered 'complied' by submission of an undertaking by the OEM in specified format along with self-certified test reports.

An undertaking is to be submitted by the OEM mentioning that "Cryptographic algorithms implemented inside the Crypto module of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch is in compliance with the respective latest FIPS standards (for the specific crypto algorithm embedded inside the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch)."

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### **2.6.4 Protecting data and information – Confidential System Internal Data**

Requirement:

- a) When the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch is in normal operational mode (i.e. not in maintenance mode) there shall be no system function that reveals confidential system internal data in the clear text to users and administrators.

Such functions could be, for example, local or remote OAM CLI or GUI, logging messages, alarms, configuration file exports etc. Confidential system internal data contains authentication data (i.e., PINs, cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) as well as system internal data that is not required for systems administration.

- b) Access to maintenance mode shall be restricted only to authorized privileged users.

[Ref: TSDSI STD T1.33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.2.2.]

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## 2.6.5 Protecting data and information in storage

Requirement:

- a. For sensitive data (persistent or temporary) in storage, read access rights shall be restricted. Sensitive files of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch that are needed for the functionality shall be protected against manipulation strictly using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" with appropriate non-repudiation controls.
- b. In addition, the following rules apply for:
  - i) Systems that need access to identification and authentication data in the clear/readable form e.g., in order to perform an activity/operation. Such systems shall not store this data in the clear/readable form, but scramble or encrypt it by implementation-specific means.
  - ii) Systems that do not need access to sensitive data (e.g., user passwords) in the clear. Such systems shall hash this sensitive data strictly using the cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only.
  - iii) Stored files in the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be protected against manipulation strictly using Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.2.3]

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## 2.6.6 Protection against Copy of Data

Requirement:

- a) L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have protection against creating a copy of data in use / data in transit.
  - b) Protective measures shall exist against use of available system functions / software residing in Network product to create copy of data for illegal transmission.
  - c) The software functions and components in the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch for creation of data copy shall be disabled or sufficiently secured to prevent illegal copy of data.
- 

## 2.6.7 Protection against Data Exfiltration - Overt Channel

Requirement:

- a) L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have mechanisms to prevent data exfiltration attacks for theft of data in use and data in transit.
- b) Establishment of outbound overt channels such as, HTTPS, Instant Messaging (IM), Peer to Peer (P2P), Email etc. shall be forbidden if they are auto-initiated by / auto-originated from the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

- c) Session logs shall be generated for establishment of any session initiated by either user or L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

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### 2.6.8 Protection against Data Exfiltration - Covert Channel

Requirement:

- a) L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have mechanisms to prevent data exfiltration attacks for theft of data in use and data in transit (within its boundary).
- b) Establishment of outbound covert channels and tunnels such as Domain Name System (DNS) Tunnel, HTTPS Tunnel, Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) Tunnel, Transport Layer Security (TLS), Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), SSH, Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), Virtual Private Network (VPN), Real-time Transfer Protocol (RTP) Encapsulation etc. shall beforbidden if they are auto-initiated by / auto-originated from the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.
- c) Session logs shall be generated for establishment of any session initiated by either user or L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

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## Section 2.7: Network Services

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### 2.7.1 Traffic Filtering – Network Level

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide a mechanism to filter incoming IP packets on any IP interface (Refer to RFC 3871). In particular, the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide a mechanism:

- a) To filter incoming IP packets on any IP interface at Network Layer and Transport Layer of the stack ISO/OSI.
- b) To allow specified actions to be taken when a filter rule matches. In particular, at least the following actions shall be supported:
- i. Discard/Drop: the matching message is discarded; no subsequent rules are applied and no answer is sent back.
  - ii. Accept: the matching message is accepted.
  - iii. Account: the matching message is accounted for i.e. a counter for the rule is incremented. This action shall be combined with the previous ones. This feature is useful to monitor traffic before its blocking.
- c) To enable/disable for each rule the logging for Dropped packets, i.e. details on messages matching the rule for troubleshooting.
- d) To filter on the basis of the value(s) of any portion of the protocol header.

- e) To reset the accounting.
- f) L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide a mechanism to disable/enable each defined rule.

[Ref: 1. TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.6.2.1

2.RFC 387: Operational Security Requirements for Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure]

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## 2.7.2 Traffic Separation

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support the physical or logical separation of traffic belonging to different network domains. For example, OAM traffic and control plane traffic belong to different network domains. Refer to RFC 3871 for further information.

[Ref: 1. TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.5.1]

2. RFC 3871 - Operational Security Requirements for Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network Infrastructure]

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## 2.7.3 Traffic Protection –Anti-Spoofing

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not process IP packets if their source address is not reachable via the incoming interface. Implementation example: Use of "Reverse Path Filter" (RPF) provides this function.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.3.1.1]

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## Section 2.8: Attack Prevention Mechanisms

### 2.8.1 Network Level and application-level DDoS

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have protection mechanisms against Network-level and Application-level Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide security measures to deal with overload situations which may occur as a result of a denial-of-service attack or during periods of increased traffic. In particular, partial or complete impairment of system availability shall be avoided. Potential protective measures may include:

- a) Restricting available RAM per application
- b) Restricting maximum sessions for a Web/Database application
- c) Defining the maximum size of a dataset

- d) Restricting Central Processing Unit (CPU) resources per process
- e) Prioritizing processes
- f) Limiting amount or size of transactions of an user or from an IP address in a specific
- g) Limiting amount or size of transactions to an IP address/Port Address in a specific time range

[Ref [3]: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.3.1]

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### 2.8.2 Excessive Overload Protection

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall act in a predictable way if an overload situation cannot be prevented. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be built in this way that it can react on an overload situation in a controlled way. However, it is possible that a situation happens where the security measures are no longer sufficient. In such case it shall be ensured that the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch cannot reach an undefined and thus potentially insecure state. In an extreme case this means that a controlled system shutdown is preferable to uncontrolled failure of the security functions and thus loss of system protection.

The OEM shall provide a technical description of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch Over Load Control mechanisms (especially whether these mechanisms rely on cooperation of other network elements).

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.3.3.3]

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### 2.8.3 Interface Robustness Requirements

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not be affected in its availability or robustness by incoming packets, from other network elements, that are manipulated or differing the norm. This means that appropriate packets shall be detected as invalid and be discarded. The process shall not be affecting the performance of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch. This robustness shall be just as effective for a great mass of invalid packets as for individual or a small number of packets.

Examples of such packets are:

- a. Mass-produced TCP packets with a set Synchronize (SYN) flag to produce half-open TCP connections (SYN flooding attack).
- b. Packets with the same IP sender address and IP recipient address (Land attack).
- c. Mass-produced ICMP packets with the broadcast address of a network as target address (Smurf attack).
- d. Fragmented IP packets with overlapping offset fields (Teardrop attack).
- e. ICMP packets that are larger than the maximum permitted size (65,535 Bytes) of IP version 4 (IPv4) packets (Ping-of-death attack).
- f. Uncorrelated reply packets (i.e. packets which cannot be correlated to any request).

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.6.2.2]

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## Section 2.9: Vulnerability Testing Requirements

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### 2.9.1 Fuzzing – Network and Application Level

Requirement:

It shall be ensured that externally reachable services of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch are reasonably robust when receiving unexpected input.

Note: Vendor is expected to provide the list of protocols supported by the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0. section 4.4.4]

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### 2.9.2 Port Scanning

Requirement:

It shall be ensured that on all network interfaces of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch, only documented ports on the transport layer respond to requests from outside the system.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.4.2]

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### 2.9.3 Vulnerability Scanning

Requirement:

The purpose of vulnerability scanning is to ensure that there no known vulnerabilities (or that relevant vulnerabilities are identified and remediation plans in place to mitigate them) on L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch, both in the OS and in the applications installed, that can be detected by means of automatic testing tools via the Internet Protocol enabled network interfaces.

The vulnerabilities found during the Vulnerability Scanning/Assessment process shall be remediated as below. For other than critical vulnerabilities, OEM shall provide a remediation plan.

Sr. No.	CVSS Score	Severity	Remediation
1	9.0 - 10.0	Critical	To be patched immediately
2	7.0 - 8.9	High	To be patched within a month
3	4.0 - 6.9	Medium	To be patched within three months
4	0.1 - 3.9	Low	To be patched within an year

vulnerabilities shall be remediated immediately or as soon as possible.

[Ref: 1. TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.4.3

2. <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss>

### 3. GSMA NG 133 Cloud Infrastructure Ref Architecture]

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## Section 2.10: Operating System

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### 2.10.1 Growing Content Handling

Requirement:

- a) Growing or dynamic content shall not influence system functions of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.
- b) A file system that reaches its maximum capacity shall lead to an event getting logged with appropriate message parameters and shall not stop L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch from operating properly. Therefore, countermeasures shall be taken to ensure that this scenario is avoided. The countermeasures are usage of dedicated filesystems, separated from main system functions, or quotas, or at least a file system monitoring.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.4.1.1.1]

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### 2.10.2 Handling of ICMP

Requirement:

Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 packets which are not required for operation shall be disabled on the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch. In particular, there are certain types of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 that are not used in most networks, but represent a risk.

ICMP message types which on receipt lead to responses or to configuration changes are not mentioned in this requirement, but they may be necessary to support relevant and specified networking features. Those must be documented.

Certain ICMP types are generally permitted and do not need to be specifically documented.

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not send certain ICMP types by default, but it may support the option to enable utilization of these types (e.g. for debugging). This is marked as "Optional" in below table.

Type (IPv4)	Type (IPv6)	Description	Send	Respond to
0	128	Echo Reply	Optional (i.e. as automatic reply to "Echo Request")	N/A
3	1	Destination Unreachable	Permitted	N/A
8	129	Echo Request	Permitted	Optional
11	3	Time Exceeded	Optional	N/A
12	4	Parameter Problem	Permitted	N/A

N/A	2	Packet Too Big	Permitted	N/A
N/A	135	Neighbour Solicitation	Permitted	Permitted
N/A	136	Neighbour Advertisement	Permitted	N/A

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not respond to, or process (i.e. do changes to configuration), under any circumstances, certain ICMP message types as marked in below table.

Type (IPv4)	Type (IPv6)	Description	Send	Respond to	Process (i.e. do changes to configuration)
5	137	Redirect	N/A	N/A	Not Permitted
13	N/A	Timestamp	N/A	Not Permitted	N/A
14	N/A	Timestamp Reply	Not Permitted (i.e. as automatic reply to "Timestamp")	N/A	N/A
N/A	133	Router Solicitation	N/A	Not Permitted	Not Permitted
N/A	134	Router Advertisement	N/A	N/A	Not Permitted

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.4.1.1.2]

### 2.10.3 Authenticated Privilege Escalation only

*Securing Networks*

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not support privilege escalation method in interactive sessions (both CLI and GUI) which allows a user to gain administrator/root privileges from another user account without re-authentication.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.4.1.2.1]

### 2.10.4 System account identification

Requirement:

Each system user account in L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have a unique User ID (UID) with



appropriate non-repudiation controls.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.4.2.2]

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### **2.10.5 OS Hardening - Minimized kernel network functions**

Requirement:

OEM shall submit the process for OS Hardening undertaken to justify that the OS is sufficiently hardened and Kernel based applications / functions not needed for the operation of the Network product are deactivated.

OEM to provide information on steps taken in this regard. In particular, the following ones shall be disabled by default:

- a) IP Packet Forwarding between different interfaces of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.
- b) Proxy Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) (to prevent resource exhaustion attack and man-in-the-middle attacks)
- c) Directed broadcast (to prevent attacks like Smurf, Denial of Service etc.)
- d) IPv4 Multicast handling. In particular, all packets with IP source or destination address belonging to the multicast IP ranges (224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255) shall be discarded by default and multicast route caching and forwarding shall be disabled to prevent Smurf and Fraggle attacks. A configuration option shall be available to enable the IPv4 multicast handling if required.
- e) Gratuitous ARP messages (to prevent ARP Cache Poisoning attacks)

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.3.3.1.2]

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### **2.10.6 No automatic launch of removable media**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not automatically launch any application when a removable media device such as Compact Disk (CD), Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), Universal Serial Bus (USB)-Sticks or USB- Storage drive is connected. If the operating system supports an automatic launch, it shall be deactivated unless it is required to support availability requirements.

[Ref [3]: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.3.3.1.3]

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### **2.10.7 Protection from buffer overflows**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support mechanisms for buffer overflow protection. Documentation which describes these buffer overflow mechanisms and also how to check that they have been enabled and/or implemented shall be provided by OEM.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.3.3.1.5]

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### 2.10.8 External file system mount restrictions

Requirement:

If normal users are allowed to mount external file systems (attached locally or via the network), OS-level restrictions shall be set properly in L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch in order to prevent privilege escalation or extended access permissions due to the contents of the mounted file systems.

OS-level restrictions shall apply to normal users against mount / use of removable media devices (e.g., USB drive, CD ROM etc.) for data transfer.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.3.3.1.6]

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### 2.10.9 File-system Authorization privileges

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be designed to ensure that only users that are authorized to modify files, data, directories or file systems have the necessary privileges to do so.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.3.2.7]

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### 2.10.10 SYN Flood Prevention

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support a mechanism to prevent Syn Flood attacks. This feature shall be enabled by default.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.3.3.1.4]

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### 2.10.11 Handling of IP options and extensions

Requirement:

IP packets with unnecessary options or extension headers shall not be processed. IP options and extension headers (e.g., source routing) are only required in exceptional cases. So, all packets with enabled IP options or extension headers shall be filtered.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section - 4.2.4.1.1.3]

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### 2.10.12 Restrictions on running Scripts / Batch-processes

Requirement:

Scheduled tasks for carrying out the activities such as taking the backups, monitoring disk space and system maintenance activities shall be executed by the privileged user such as administrator only. Similarly, L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have a feature to restrict Scripts / Batch Processes / Macros usage among various users. It shall be possible to administratively configure scheduled tasks usage

i.e. Cron-Job usage (permit / deny) among various users like Normal users, privileged users.

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### 2.10.13 Restrictions on Soft-Restart

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall restrict software-based system restart options usage among various users. The software reset / restart either through command or use of key-combinations like CTRL+ALT+DEL is not available to normal users for prevention of unintended / malicious trigger of system reset / restart.

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## Section 2.11: Web Servers

*This entire section of the security requirements is applicable if the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch supports web management interface.*

### 2.11.1 HTTPS

Requirement:

The communication between Web client and Web server shall be protected strictly using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table1 of the latest document "Cryptographic Controls for Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirement ITSAR" only.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.5.1]

### 2.11.2 Webserver logging

Requirement:

Access to the webserver (both successful as well as failed attempts) shall be logged by L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch. The web server log shall contain the following information:

- 1) Access timestamp
- 2) Source (IP address)
- 3) Account (if known)
- 4) Attempted login name (if the associated account does not exist)
- 5) Relevant fields in http request. The URL should be included whenever possible.
- 6) Status code of web server response

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.5.2.1]

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### 2.11.3 HTTP input validation

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch Web Server shall have a mechanism in place to ensure that web

application inputs are not vulnerable to command injection or cross-site scripting attacks. The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch Web Server shall validate, filter, escape, and encode user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.5.4]

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#### **2.11.4 No system privileges**

Requirement:

No web server processes shall run with system privileges. This is best achieved if the web server runs under an account that has minimum privileges. If a process is started by a user with system privileges, execution shall be transferred to a different user without system privileges after the start.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.2]

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#### **2.11.5 No unused HTTP methods**

Requirement:

HTTP methods that are not required for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch operation shall be deactivated.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.3]

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#### **2.11.6 No unused add-ons**

Requirement:

All optional add-ons and components of the web server shall be deactivated if they are not required for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch operation. In particular, Common Gateway Interface (CGI) or other scripting components, Server Side Includes (SSI), and Web based Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) shall be deactivated if they are not required.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.4]

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#### **2.11.7 No compiler, interpreter, or shell via CGI or other server- side scripting**

Requirement:

If CGI (Common Gateway Interface) or other scripting technology is used, the CGI/Scripting directory shall be configured with execute rights. Other directories used or meant for web content shall not have execute rights.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.5]

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#### **2.11.8 No CGI or other scripting for uploads**

Requirement:

If CGI or other scripting technology is used, the associated CGI/script directory shall not be used for

uploads.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.6]

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### **2.11.9 No execution of system commands with SSI**

Requirement:

If Server Side Includes (SSI) is active, the execution of system commands shall be deactivated.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.7]

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### **2.11.10 Access rights for web server configuration**

Requirement:

Access rights for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server configuration files shall only be granted to the owner of the web server process or to a user with system privileges. Implementation example: Delete "read" and "write" access rights for "others." Only grant "write" access to the user who configures the web server.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.8]

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### **2.11.11 No default content**

Requirement:

Default content (examples, help files, documentation, aliases) that is provided with the standard installation of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server shall be removed.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.9]

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### **2.11.12 No directory listings**

Requirement:

Directory listings (indexing) / "Directory browsing" shall be deactivated.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.10]

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### **2.11.13 Web server information in HTTP headers**

Requirement:

The HTTP header shall not include information on the version of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server and the modules/add-ons used.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.11]

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### **2.11.14 Web server information in error pages**

**Requirement:**

User-defined error pages shall not include version information about the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server and the modules/add-ons used. Error messages shall not include internal information such as internal server names, error codes, etc. Default error pages of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server shall be replaced by error pages defined by the OEM

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.12]

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**2.11.15 Minimized file type mappings****Requirement:**

File type- or script-mappings that are not required for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch operation shall be deleted, e.g. php, phtml, js, sh, csh, bin, exe, pl, vbe, vbs.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.13]

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**2.11.16 Restricted file access****Requirement:**

Restrictive access rights shall be assigned to all files which are directly or indirectly (e.g. via links or in virtual directories) in the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server's document directory. In particular, the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server shall not be able to access files which are not meant to be delivered.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.3.4.14]

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**2.11.17 HTTP User sessions****Requirement:**

To protect user sessions the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch web server shall support the following session ID and session cookie requirements:

- a) The session ID shall uniquely identify the user and distinguish the session from all other active sessions.
- b) The session ID shall be unpredictable.
- c) The session ID shall not contain sensitive information in clear text (e.g. account number, social security, etc.).
- d) In addition to the Session Idle Timeout the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch Web server shall terminate automatically sessions after a configurable maximum lifetime. This maximum lifetime defines the maximum session span. When the maximum lifetime expires, the session shall be closed, the session ID shall be deleted and the user shall be forced to (re)authenticate in the web application and to establish a new session. The default value for this maximum lifetime shall be set to 8 hours.
- e) Session ID's shall be regenerated for each new session (e.g. each time a user logs in)

- f) The session ID shall not be reused or renewed in subsequent sessions
- g) The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not use persistent cookies to manage sessions but only session cookies. This means that neither the "expire" nor the "max-age" attribute shall be set in the cookies.
- h) Where session cookies are used the attribute 'Http Only' shall be set to true
- i) Where session cookies are used the 'domain' attribute shall be set to ensure that the cookie can only be sent to the specified domain.
- j) Where session cookies are used the 'path' attribute shall be set to ensure that cookie can only be sent to the specified directory or sub-directory.
- k) The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall not accept session identifiers from GET/POST variables.
- l) The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be configured to only accept server generate session ID's.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 section 4.2.5.3]

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### **2.11.18 Execute rights exclusive for CGI/Scripting directory**

Requirement:

If CGI or other scripting technology is used, only the CGI/Scripting directory shall be configured with execute rights. Other directories used or meant for web content shall not have execute rights.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0. section 4.3.4.15]

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## **Section 2.12: Other Security requirements**

### **2.12.1 Remote Diagnostic Procedure - Verification**

Requirement:

If the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch is providing Remote access for troubleshooting purposes/alarm maintenance then it shall be allowed only for authorized users, other than the root user.

All activities performed by the remote user are to be logged by the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch with the following parameters:

- a) User id
- b) Time stamp
- c) Interface type
- d) Event type (e.g., CRITICAL, MAJOR, MINOR)
- e) Command/activity performed
- f) Result type (e.g., SUCCESS, FAILURE).
- g) IP Address of remote machine

[Ref: GSMA NG 133: GSM Association Non-confidential Official Document NG.133]

---

### **2.12.2 No System Password Recovery**

Requirement:

In the event of system password reset, the entire configuration of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be irretrievably deleted. No provision shall exist for password recovery.

---

### **2.12.3 Secure System Software Revocation**

Requirement:

Once the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch software image is legally updated/upgraded with New Software Image, it shall normally not be possible to roll back to a previous software image. In case roll back is essential, it shall be done only by the administrator with appropriate non-repudiation controls. L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support a well-established control mechanism for rolling back to previous software image.

---

### **2.12.4 Software Integrity Check - Installation**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall validate the software package integrity before the installation stage strictly using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" only. Tampered software shall not be executed or installed if integrity check fails.

[Ref: TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.3.5]

---

### **2.12.5 Software Integrity Check - Boot**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall verify the integrity of a software component by comparing the result of a measurement of the component, typically a standard cryptographic hash generated strictly using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "ITSAR for Cryptographic Controls" to the expected Ref value.

---

### **2.12.6 Unused Physical and Logical Interfaces Disabling**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support the mechanism to verify both the physical and logical interfaces exist in the product. Physical and logical accessible interfaces (except console interface) which are not under use shall be disabled so that they remain inactive even in the event of reboot.

**Note:** List of the default used Physical/Logical Interfaces/Ports as given by the OEM shall match the list of Physical/Logical Interfaces/Ports that are necessary for the operation of the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch.

---



### 2.12.7 Predefined accounts shall be deleted or disabled

Requirement:

Predefined or default user accounts (other than Admin/Root) in L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall be deleted or disabled.

[Ref TEC 25848:2022: TSDSI STD T1.3GPP 33.117-17.5.0 V1.5.0 Section 4.2.3.4.2.2]

---

### 2.12.8 Security Algorithm Modification

Requirement:

When L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch is establishing session/ communication channel with any other Network element, or while communication in the progress, L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall have protection against a downgrade attack/bidding down attack for the use of a weaker algorithm.

---



## Chapter 3: Specific Security Requirements

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### Section 3.1: Layer 2 & Layer 3 Switching Related Requirements

---

#### 3.1.1 Control Plane Traffic

Requirements:

Switch functionalities like building Routing tables, forwarding tables, MAC Table, crypto algorithm/Key negotiations are considered under control plane traffic.

Dynamic routing protocols such as (RIP, OSPF, BGP etc.) are the most widely deployed which comes under control plane, a malicious user may spoof or modify valid routing protocol messages and corrupt or change routing tables of a network. This might result in redirection of some or all network traffic, connectivity problems, excessive bandwidth consumption and potential denial of service of both the switch and the routing protocol. Failure to secure the exchange of routing information allows an attacker to introduce false routing information into the network. Control plane traffic shall be secured through routing protocol authentication, passive interfaces, route filtering, and rate-limiting

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switches shall ensure control plane protection by implementing filtering and rate-limiting mechanisms.

Control plane traffic shall be protected in the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch by using Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table 1 of the latest document "Indian Telecommunication Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR) for Cryptographic Controls".

---

#### 3.1.2 VLAN Isolation and Traffic Protection

Requirements:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide VLAN isolation to ensure secure separation of different network segments and support secure inter-VLAN routing to ensure that traffic between VLANs is filtered and monitored. Access Control Lists (ACLs) must be enforced at routing points to prevent unauthorized inter-VLAN traffic.

---

#### 3.1.3 NAPT (Network Address Port Translation) services support

Requirements:

If L3 LAN Switch supports NAPT services, it shall have protection mechanism against possible attacks such as NAT Traversal attacks, Pin hole attacks and NAT Slipstreaming Etc.

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches.

---

#### 3.1.4 Access Banners

Requirements:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide the requirement of banner displayed prior to the

establishment dialogue for a session. Before establishing a user session, L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorized use of L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch

---

### **3.1.5 Inter -VLAN Routing support**

Requirements:

L3 LAN Switch shall not allow Inter-VLAN routing functionality by default. It shall be enabled only through permitted configuration by administrator.

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches

---

### **3.1.6 Routing updates security**

Requirements:

For Inter AS routing updates, facility shall exist in L3 LAN Switch for administrative accept /reject routing updates to prevent Routing table poisoning attacks.

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches

---

### **3.1.7 Avoidance of Routing Loops**

Requirements:

L3 LAN Switch shall implement routing loop prevention mechanisms such as split horizon, poison reverse, hold down timers etc.

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches

---

[Ref RF 1058, RFC 7868 RFC 4762]

---

### **3.1.8 Avoidance of Layer 2 Loops**

Requirements:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support STP security mechanisms, including BPDU guard, root guard, and loop guard, to mitigate STP attacks such as rogue bridge insertion.

[Ref: IEEE 802.1D, IEEE 802.1Q & IEEE 802.1w]

---

### **3.1.9 Traffic Shaping and Rate Limiting**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall provide traffic shaping and rate-limiting capabilities to manage bandwidth allocation on a per-port, per-VLAN, per-traffic-class or per VRF (Applicable only to Layer3) basis.

- Customizable rate-limiting policies shall prevent individual devices or applications from

consuming excessive traffic.

- Administrators shall have the ability to configure traffic shaping rules that prioritize critical traffic over less important network activity.

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2698> & [rfc8325](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8325)]

---

### **3.1.10 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Security**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall include MLD snooping for IPv6 multicast traffic and IGMP snooping for IPV4 allowing only valid hosts to join multicast groups. It shall also support MLD filtering to block unauthorized or excessive multicast traffic from congesting the network.

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541> & section 2.1.2]

---

### **3.1.11 Protection against ARP Cache Poisoning Attacks**

Requirement:

L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support mechanisms such as Dynamic ARP inspection, TARP, monitoring tools for ARP traffic and detect anomalies like rapidly changing IP-MAC address associations, indicating potential ARP poisoning attempts, packet filtering etc.

### **3.1.12 DHCP Snooping Security with Detailed Event Logging**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall log all DHCP snooping events, including valid and invalid DHCP responses, unauthorized DHCP servers, and suspicious activities like DHCP starvation attempts. Logs shall capture the MAC address, IP address, and interface associated with each DHCP event.

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7513>]

---

### **3.1.13 SNMP Trap/Info and Syslog for Security Violations**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support SNMP traps/info and syslog for real-time notifications of security violations, including unauthorized access and configuration changes. SNMP messages must be sent over SNMPv3 with encryption, and Syslog messages must utilize a secure channel. Additionally, the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall allow for customized security alert thresholds to prioritize critical events.

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5590>]

---

### **3.1.14 Protection against Routing Table Poisoning Attacks**

Requirement:

The L3 LAN Switch shall support Routing Table Poisoning attack protection mechanisms such as

authentication on routing protocols to verify the source of routing updates, route filtering to only accept routing updates from trusted sources, monitoring tools to detect suspicious routing updates and potential poisoning attempts etc.

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches.

---

### 3.1.15 Protection against BGP Hijacking

Requirement:

The L3 LAN Switch shall support BGP Prefix origin validation to ensure that the origin AS of route is valid for the advertised routes. The L3 LAN Switch shall maintain an Origin Validation database consisting of static and dynamic entries (VRP or Validated ROA Payload) for the purposes of determining the origin validation state of received BGP routes. The L3 LAN Switch shall support the RPKI-RTR protocol over TCP/IPv4 or TCP/IPv6 to learn Dynamic VRP entries. The communication between the L3 LAN Switch and the validator cache shall be protected as per the requirements specified in RFC 8210.

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches

[Ref: RFC 8210, RFC 6480]

---

### 3.1.16 Routing Protocol Security

Requirement:

The L3 LAN Switch shall support authentication mechanisms for Exterior & interior protocols, using cryptographic authentication with SHA algorithms (using the secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table1 of the latest document “Cryptographic Controls for Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR)” only.) for route advertisements and updates. Additionally, route filtering and policy-based routing must be supported to prevent unauthorized route advertisements or incorrect route propagation. L3 LAN Switch shall also support route filtering and prevention of routing information sharing on UNI. *Securing Networks*

Note: Applicable only to Layer 3 switches

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7416>]

---

### 3.1.17 MAC Table Overflow Protection and Port Security

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall protect against MAC table overflow attacks by implementing MAC limiting and port security features, allowing a maximum number of MAC addresses to be learned per port.

- Dynamic MAC filtering shall be enabled to mitigate MAC address spoofing attempts.
- MAC address filtering rules shall be configurable, allowing for both static and dynamically learned entries with specified limits.

- Upon detecting an unauthorized MAC address, the L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall block access, disable the port, and generate alerts.
- The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support MAC address filtering at the port level, permitting only trusted MAC addresses to access the network.

[Ref: IEEE 802.1X & <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6325>]

---

### **3.1.18 Private VLAN Support with Controlled Communication**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall support PVLAN configurations to isolate devices within the same VLAN, allowing controlled communication between designated devices. Administrators shall configure primary, isolated, and community VLANs, with ACLs managing inter-VLAN communication.

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5517>]

---

### **3.1.19 Flow Control Security**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch shall implement IEEE 802.3x flow control for secure management of network congestion, ensuring that excessive traffic is managed through controlled pauses instead of being dropped.

Flow control settings shall be configured to protect critical services from disruptions caused by pause operations.

[Ref: IEEE 802.3x & <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4448>]

---

### **3.1.20 DoS/DDoS Protection Mechanism Validation**

Requirement:

The L2 and (or) L3 switch shall mitigate DoS/DDoS threats through filtering and rate-limiting, ensuring network stability by protecting against abnormal or malicious traffic flows. It shall prioritize and safeguard high-priority packets during congestion using techniques like strict priority queuing and traffic shaping.

[Ref: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4958>]

---

## **Section 3.2: API Related**

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*(Applicable if APIs are supported, including APIs towards MANO)*

### **3.2.1 The client and authorization servers shall mutually authenticate**

Requirement:

APIs shall only allow themselves to be accessed by authorized users. One solution for authorizing access is the use of OAuth2.0 with access token. The client shall authenticate the resource server and vice versa. Mutual authentication is done by the transport layer protection and is required.

[Ref: 1) ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3 2) ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (Feb 2022), BP-T23, BP-P1]

---

### **3.2.2 Authentication of the Request Originator**

Requirement:

Before accepting the token as valid, the resource server shall authenticate the originator of the request as the legitimate owner of the token. The token shall bound to the subject through the subject Identifier, which shall ensure that the token has been provided for this consumer.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.3 Requirements for client credentials**

Requirement:

- a) The client credentials shall be stored in a secure and tamper-resistant location or stored encrypted with the key protected in a tamper-resistant location.
- b) The client credentials shall not be included in the source code and software packages.
- c) The client credentials shall be installed in the client in a secure way, eliminating any possibility of gaining access to these credentials during installation.
- d) The client credentials shall be possible for the authorization server to revoke the client credentials.

[Ref: 1) ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3 2) ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (February 2022), BP-T23]

---

### **3.2.4 Access Token shall be signed**

Requirement:

The access token shall be signed to detect manipulation of the token or production of fake tokens. Access tokens shall be secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MAC) based on JSON Web Signature (JWS). It shall be possible to encrypt the content of the access token.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.5 Format of Access Token**

Requirement:

The access token shall be defined in a standard format (SAML or JWT).

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.6 Access tokens shall have limited lifetimes**

Requirement:

The access token shall include a claim for the expiration time (expiration).

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.7 Access tokens shall be restricted to a particular number of operations**

Requirement:

There shall be a restriction on the number of operations that an access token can perform in order to mitigate the replay attack by a malicious client.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.8 Access token shall be bound to the intended resource server.**

Requirement:

The access token shall include a claim for the device ID of the Service Producer (audience). By using token binding, a client can enforce the use of a specified external authentication mechanism with the token.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.9 Tokens shall be bound to the client ID**

Requirement:

The access token shall include a claim for the device ID of the Service Consumer (subject) which is the "Client ID."

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

### **3.2.10 Token Revocation**

Requirement:

Token Revocation shall be possible. Unbound tokens shall not be used under any circumstance. The authorization server shall provide a mechanism for token revocation. If not, the lifetime of the Access



token shall be kept very short, or the access token shall be single use. If a scheme to bind access tokens to the underlying transport layer relies on non-standard extensions, and those extensions are not available, the system shall fail securely, preventing a bid-down attack.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022 V2.7.1 Section 4.3]

---

## **Section 3.3: SDN Related (Applicable for SDN supported switches)**

---

### **3.3.1 Mutual authentication within SDN**

Requirement:

There must be mutual authentication between the controller and the switching/routing entities in SDN.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV SEC 001 V1.1.1 (2014-10) clause 6.1.3.1.1]

---

### **3.3.2 Centralized Log Auditing**

Requirement:

All the SDN elements shall submit security events (e.g. authentication, authorization and accounting, login attempts, administration functions and configurations etc) as defined in Log table in Clause 2.5.2 to a centralized platform, which shall monitor and analyses in real time the messages for possible attempts at intrusion.

[Ref: ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (Feb 2022), BP-T17]

Note: The parameters/features that are required to be configured/enabled for successful testing are to be made available in the system/DUT in fulfillment of this clause.

---

### **3.3.3 SDN controller and associated SDN communications**

Requirement:

An SDN controller shall always communicate with its associated SDN resources using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table1 of the latest document “Cryptographic Controls For Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements ( ITSAR )” only.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-EVE 005 Section 6.1, REC#1]

---

### **3.3.4 Prevent attacks via forwarding plane**

Requirement:

There shall be mechanisms to prevent attacks mounted via the Forwarding Plane against SDN switches and controllers. OEMs shall submit the list of measures taken to prevent reconnaissance attacks, DoS and resource exhaustion attacks and vulnerability exploits.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-EVE 005 Section 6.2, REC#1]

---

### **3.3.5 Prevent attacks via control network**

Requirement:

- a) There shall be mechanisms to mitigate attacks from the control network. TLS 1.2 or higher shall be used to protect integrity.
- b) There shall be High-Availability (HA) controller architecture.
- c) The configuration of secure and authenticated administrator access to controllers shall be enabled.
- d) Role-Based Access Control policies shall be implemented for controller administrators.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-EVE 005 Section 6.2, REC#2]

---

### **3.3.6 Prevent attacks via SDN controller's Application Control Interface**

Requirement:

- a) There shall be mechanisms to mitigate attacks via the SDN Controller's Application Control Interface such as TLS 1.2 or higher shall be used to secure northbound communications and secure controller management.
- b) The SDN systems shall be configured to validate flows in network device tables against controller policy.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-EVE 005 Section 6.2, REC#3]

---

### **3.3.7 Prevent attacks via virtualized environment**

Requirement:

There shall be mechanisms to mitigate attacks against controllers and switches via the Virtualized environment. OEMs shall submit the list of measures taken to prevent such attacks.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-EVE 005 Section 6.2, REC#4]

---

### **3.3.8 Northbound Applications**

Requirement:

- a) Northbound applications, including the orchestrators, shall not be assigned admin level access to the controllers.
  - b) The identity of northbound applications shall be confirmed through certificates.
- 

### 3.3.9 SDN security management

Requirement:

- a) The controls below shall be applied if message bus technology for communication between SDN elements is used.
  - i) A strong mechanism to authenticate the integrity of messages must be deployed between the 'publisher' and 'producer' over the message bus.
  - ii) No messages shall be accepted or processed by the message broker or 'consumer' systems from unknown, 'fake' or unauthenticated users.
  - iii) The communications shall be secured using TLS 1.2 and above security or certificates where supported (e.g. Kafka).
  - iv) The message bus shall be monitored for any unauthenticated messages or 'fake' or default usernames and a security alarm raised for investigation.
- b) The security functionality shall be deployed that identifies potential attacks on any SDN elements. Any security functionality shall provide automated alarms and the ability to change the network or element configuration to mitigate the attack.
- c) A high availability architecture shall be implemented for key SDN components (e.g. SDN Controllers) to ensure operational service is maintained. The design shall include primary and secondary IP links with, where possible, diverse routing to allow for single point of network failure.
- d) Any changes to network, service and virtual environments shall be restricted to the orchestrator. The SDN Controller and the VNFM/CNFM and VIM/CISM shall have additional controls applied to them to restrict such access for normal operation. Restricting the SDN Controller and the VNFM/CNFM and VIM/CISM will prevent the application of rules and changes that may break policy and rules during deployment of service templates.
- e) The orchestration layer and SDN must be architected so that SDN networks and NFV environments are not operationally dependent on the orchestration or MANO layer to maintain operating services under circumstances that may render the orchestration platform unavailable.

[Ref: ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (Feb 2022), BP-T22]

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## Section 3.4: MANO Related

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*(For Cloud Native Switches, Virtual Switches or any switch implementation which may use orchestrator)*

### **3.4.1 Instantiation of MANO components**

Requirement:

The MANO system shall allow instantiation of MANO components and managed entities, the NFVIs, only at explicit geographic locations. It may be enforced through attribute-based access control and attribute based or multi-factor authentication (where location is one of the behavioral factors).

---

### **3.4.2 Message handling in MANO**

Requirement:

The transmitter of a message shall provide means that will allow for the determination of any modification, deletion, insertion, or replay has occurred. The transmitting party shall enable a complete message and session integrity service.

[Ref- ETSI GS NFV-SEC 014 V3.1.1 Section 6]

---

### **3.4.3 Data Transfer in MANO**

Requirement:

Data transferred over any internal interface of MANO shall be protected using the Secure cryptographic controls prescribed in Table1 of the latest document “Cryptographic Controls For Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements ( ITSAR )” only.

[Ref- ETSI GS NFV-SEC 014 V3.1.1 Section 6]

---

### **3.4.4 Centralized log auditing**

Requirement:

All the MANO elements shall submit security events (e.g. authentication, authorization and accounting, login attempts, administration functions and configurations) to a centralized platform, which shall monitor and analyze in real time the messages for possible attempts at intrusion.

[Ref: ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (Feb 2022), BP-T17]

---

### **3.4.5 VIM connectivity to virtualization layer**

Requirement:

The connectivity between the VIM and the virtualization layer shall support a secure access protocol (e.g. IPSec, TLS) to protect against the eavesdropping of password information. It is also required that the secure access shall support mutual authentication before allowing any O&M connectivity.

[Ref: ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (Feb 2022), BP-T24]

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## Section 3.5: VNF\_CNF Related

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*(Applicable for Virtual, Cloud Native and Cloud Managed Switches)*

### 3.5.1 VNF/CNF network security profile

Requirement:

- a) Each VNF/CNF supporting VNFC functions shall have a predefined network security profile describing its requirements for vNICs, ports, port group, VLANs and the requirement for internal VXLAN connections.
- b) The security profile shall also define the vNIC firewall rules related to protocols (port numbers) that need to be supported on each VLAN or VXLAN connection. There shall never be a requirement for all ports to be open, particularly on external standard-based interfaces (e.g. GTP).

---

### 3.5.2 VNF/CNF Host Spanning

Requirement:

- a) All control plane data in transit between hosts shall be sent over an encrypted and authenticated channel using the protocols as prescribed in Table1 of the latest document "Cryptographic Controls For Indian Telecom Security Assurance Requirements (ITSAR)".
- b) User plane traffic between hosts should be protected.
- c) The system shall prevent and detect unauthorized VNF/CNF host spanning.

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-0.11.0 Section 5.15]

---

### 3.5.3 Input validation

Requirement:

The VNF/CNF must implement the following input validation controls:

- i) Size (length) of all input shall be checked.
- ii) Large-size input that can cause the VNF/CNF to fail shall not be allowed. If the input is a file, the VNF /CNF API must enforce a size limit.
- iii) Input that contains content or characters inappropriate to the input expected by the design shall not be permitted. Inappropriate input, such as SQL expressions shall not be

allowed.

[Ref: ONAP- VNF API security requirements, October 2022]

---

### 3.5.4 Key Management and security within cloned images

Requirement:


Cloned images shall not possess cryptographic key pairs utilized by their original image. Propagation of two or more images with the same key pairs immediately cancels out the notion of utilizing key pairs for the purpose of establishing identity.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 Section 4.4.3.3.1]

---

### 3.5.5 Encrypted Data Processing

Requirement:

- 
- a) Sensitive data shall only be decrypted or handled in an unencrypted format in VNFs/CNFs on trusted and well-known hosts.
  - b) It shall be possible to further restrict VNFs/CNFs on a single host depending on whether they handle decrypted sensitive data.
  - c) These controls shall be verified by secure hardware backed attestation of the health and security of the host. Controls shall be verified and enforced at boot time and each time a function is migrated.
  - d) The system shall prevent and detect unauthorized data manipulation and leakage (e.g., modification of VNF/CNF images, instantiating parallel VM(s) on same physical CPU).

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-0.11.0 Section 5.16]

---

### 3.5.6 GVNP Life Cycle Management Security

Requirement:

- a) VNF shall authenticate VNFM when VNFM initiates a communication to VNF.
- b) VNF shall be able to establish securely protected connection with the VNFM.
- c) VNF shall check whether VNFM has been authorized when VNFM access VNF's API.
- d) VNF shall log VNFM's management operations for auditing.

[Ref: TSDSI RPT T1.3GPP TS 33.818-17.1.0. Section 5.2.5.5.7.1]

Note: This test case is optional when the VNF and VNFM belongs to the same VNF vendor. If the VNF and VNFM belongs to the same VNF vendor and the interface between VNF and VNFM is proprietary

interface, the API level authorization is not needed

---

### **3.5.7 Instantiating VNF from trusted VNF image**

Requirement:

A VNF shall be initiated from one or more trusted images in a VNF package. The VNF image(s) shall be signed by an authorized party. The authorized party is trusted by the operators.

[Ref: TSDSI RPT T1.3GPP TS 33.818-17.1.0. Section 5.2.5.5.7.3]

---

### **3.5.8 Inter-VNF and intra-VNF Traffic Separation**

Requirement:

The network used for the communication between the VNFCs of a VNF (intra-VNF traffic) and the network used for the communication between VNFs (inter-VNF traffic) shall be separated to prevent the security threats from the different networks affecting each other.

[Ref: 3GPP TS 33.818-17.1.0 Section 5.2.5.5.8.5.2]

---

### **3.5.9 Security functional requirements on virtualization resource management**

Requirement:

- a) To prevent a compromised VIM from changing the assigned virtualized resource, the VNF shall alert to the OAM. For example, when an instantiated VNF is running, a compromised VIM can delete a VM which is running VNFCI, and the VNF shall alert the OAM when the VNF cannot detect a VNFC message.
- b) A VNF shall log the access from the VIM.

[Ref: 3GPP TS 33.818 v17.1.0 Section 5.2.5.6.7.2 2) ENISA NFV Security in 5G- Challenges and Best Practices (February 2022)]

---

### **3.5.10 VNF package and VNF image integrity**

Requirement:

- 1) VNF package and the image shall contain integrity validation value (e.g. MAC).
- 2) VNF package shall be integrity protected during onboarding and its integrity shall be validated by the NFVO.

[Ref: 3GPP TS 33.818- 17.1.0 Section 5.2.5.5.3.3.5.1 2) ENISA NFV Security in 5G- Challenges and Best Practices (February 2022), BP-T2]

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### **3.5.11 Proper image management of VM images must be done**

Requirement:

Images shall be carefully protected against unauthorized access, modification, and replacement by both systems and human actors.

- a) Cryptographic checksum protection shall be used to detect unauthorized changes to images and snapshots.
- b) Strict control around access, creation and deployment of images/instances shall be implemented. Such activities shall be recorded for audit purposes.

[Ref: ENISA Security Aspects of Virtualization (Feb 2017) G-07, PG 37, OS-01, OS-02]

---

### 3.5.12 Secrets in NF Container/VM Image

Requirement:

The VNF/CNF images shall not be packaged with embedded secrets such as passwords or credentials, or any other critical configuration data.

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0. Section 5.28]

---

### 3.5.13 Container image authorization

Requirement:

Public cloud service provider shall give an undertaking that geo-fencing has been enabled so that container images can only run on particular platforms.

[Ref: CNCF CLOUD NATIVE SECURITY WHITEPAPER Ver 2.0]

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## Section 3.6: Virtual Machine Related

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*(Applicable to Virtual Switches Cloud Managed Switch or any switch implementation which involves VMs)*

### 3.6.1 Secure crash measures for VMs running on hypervisors

Requirement:

The following clauses must be satisfied:

- a) Hypervisors shall ensure that in the event of the crash of a VNF component instance, all file Refs,



hardware pass-through devices, and memory are safe from access by unauthorized entities.

- b) If the application running within the VM crashes, but not the VM itself, the hypervisor shall ensure that no changes to the existing authorizations are made.

NOTE: The hypervisor might be unaware that the application within the VM has crashed.

- c) In the event of a crash, arrangements shall be made for the relevant NFV instance to wipe the remote storage (e.g. the VNF Manager might instruct the Virtualization Infrastructure Manager to request this).
- d) If the VNF component instance is using swap storage, it shall be marked as such and the hypervisor ought to wipe it in the event of a crash.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV SEC 001 V1.1.1 (2014-10) clause 6.4]

### 3.6.2 Memory Introspection

Requirement:

- a) An NFV environment shall use a virtualization platform which prevents one function from inspecting memory of other functions.
- b) Delegated administrator roles shall be used to ensure that administrators do not have the ability to inspect memory of functions except under exceptional circumstances such as for network forensics.
- c) The system shall manage the hypervisor to enforce network security policies. This includes, but is not limited to, ensuring that: -
- i. VMs are isolated from each other
  - ii. Applications shall be prevented from accessing each other's memory spaces,
  - iii. VMs shall be prevented from accessing the memory of another VM,
  - iv. Keys used to encrypt the memory shall be kept under hypervisor control,
  - v. Hypervisors shall not be allowed to write directly to memory,
  - vi. Hypervisors shall not be allowed to bypass normal memory access controls and security within the VNF/VM,
  - vii. Hypervisors shall not be allowed to change data within a 3GPP VNF at run-time.

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0. Section 5.8]

## Section 3.7: Container Related

*(Applicable to Cloud Native Switches or any switch implementation which involves containers)*

### 3.7.1 Container breakout

**Requirement:**

- a) The virtualization layer shall provide capabilities to limit the impact on co-hosted containers caused by a rogue container escaping its isolation. One of the commonly practiced security controls is to enforce strict resource limits on container usage, which helps in preventing resource starvation due to an attack by a rogue container.
- b) The virtualization layer shall enforce the principle of 'least privilege' which ensures that no containers run with a privilege higher than what is actually required.

[Ref: 1) 3GPP TR 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0. Section 5.27 2) ENISA NFV Security in 5G -Challenges and Best Practices (Feb 2022) BP-T31]

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**3.7.2 Container Platform Integrity****Requirement:**

The following shall be implemented to ensure the integrity of the container platform

- a) The Kubernetes cluster shall be hardened against known attacks through suitable configurations. The Container Platform's Kubernetes cluster shall be hardened by following security guidelines and by running appropriate tools.
- b) Opening up direct access to worker nodes shall not be resorted.
- c) Worker node subnets shall be on private subnets (no access to the Internet) unless explicitly required (e.g., web server).
- d) Container platform information and verified firmware and configuration measurements that are retained within an attestation service shall be used for policy enforcement. It shall also be possible to label worker nodes in the database with key value attributes.

[Ref: NSA-CISA Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures Part IV: Ensure Integrity of Cloud Infrastructure (2021)]

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**3.7.3 Container Image Hygiene****Requirement:**

The following best practices shall be implemented

- (a) Multi-stage builds shall be used to create minimal images. Container images shall be devoid of build tools and other extraneous binaries.
- (b) Container images shall be regularly scanned for any vulnerabilities
- (c) Container shall not run as root.

[Ref: NSA-CISA Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures Part IV: Ensure Integrity of Cloud Infrastructure (2021)]

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### **3.7.4 Securely Isolate Network Resources (Pod Security)**

Requirement:

- a) Pods with containers configured to run as privileged shall be rejected using the technical controls and policies provided by the container orchestration platform.
- b) Container shall not allow processes to run as root
- c) Container orchestration platforms shall provide technical controls and policies to prevent privilege escalation.
- d) Container orchestration platforms shall provide technical controls and policies to restrict directories used by host Path and ensure that those directories are read only.
- e) Critical Containers shall be cryptographically isolated using TEEs

Note: The parameters/features that are required to be configured/enabled for successful testing are to be made available in the system/DUT in fulfillment of this clause.

[Ref: NSA-CISA Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures Part II: Securely Isolate Network Resources, 2021]

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### **3.7.5 Runtime security**

Requirement:

Permitted syscalls shall be restricted to an allow-list to decrease the application's attack surface.

[Ref: NSA-CISA Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures Part II: Securely Isolate Network Resources,2021]

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### **3.7.6 Real-time threat detection and incident response**

Requirement:

Attestation services shall be used to verify configuration policy and container metrics (e.g., hash of files, time to execute a module) at both boot and run times.

[Ref: NSA-CISA Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures Part II: Securely Isolate Network Resources,2021]

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## **Section 3.8: NFV Infrastructure (Platform) Related**

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*(Applicability of clauses are based on the switch implementation)*

### **3.8.1 CPU Pinning**

Requirement:

When a VM instance is created, the vCPUs are, by default, not assigned to a particular host CPU. Certain workloads require real-time or near real-time behavior viz., uninterrupted access to their cores. For such workloads, CPU pinning shall be possible to bind an instance's vCPUs to a particular host's cores or SMT threads.

Note: It is possible for OEM to demonstrate this clause with an example of CPU pinning.

[Ref: GSMA NG.133 - Cloud Infrastructure Ref Architecture]

### **3.8.2 Workload Placement**

Requirement:

Affinity Rule: It specifies workloads that shall be hosted on the same computer node.

Non-Affinity Rule: It specifies workloads that shall not be hosted on the same computer node. It shall be possible to segregate workloads based on server groups (affinity and non-affinity groups)

Note: It should be possible for OEM to demonstrate this clause with examples

[Ref: GSMA NG.133 - Cloud Infrastructure Ref Architecture]

### **3.8.3 SR-IOV and DPDK Considerations**

Requirement:

Acceleration techniques like DPDK, SR-IOV usually bypasses security protections. Measures shall be taken to ensure security when these technologies are employed to accelerate network packet processing.

Note: OEM shall give the list of measures which shall be verified

### **3.8.4 Hardware-Based Root of Trust (HBRT)**

Requirement:

- a) The host system shall include an HBRT or Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as Initial Root of Trust. The HBRT shall be based on hardware-based TPM or equivalent hardware root of trust (e.g., Secure Element including TPM functionalities, HSM including TPM functionalities).

- b) The host system HBRT shall be able to provide isolated instances of the HBRT capabilities for individual workloads.
- c) The host system HBRT shall include a hardware-based compute engine to be used by the workloads for cryptographic and security functionality.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012 V3.1.1 (2017-01) Sec 8.10]

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### 3.8.5 Core Hardware -HBRT

Requirement:

- (a) The HBRT shall be both physically and electronically tamper-resistant.
- (b) The HBRT shall be both physically and electronically tamper-evident.
- (c) The HBRT physical and software interfaces between the HBRT and other hardware components of the host system to which it directly communicates shall be protected from eavesdropping, manipulation, replay or similar attacks.
- (d) It shall be possible to restrict the booting procedure if assistance from the HBRT is not available or the HBRT currently does not contain valid cryptographic material.
- (e) Any tampering to the HBRT shall lead to detectable degradation of its function.
- (f) The HBRT shall be (physically and/or logically) bound to the host system, so that any attempt to remove the HBRT will be detected and prevent normal operation of the host system.
- (g) The HBRT shall include an Immutable Unique Identification value physically linked to the physical root of trust that can be used as identification of the platform. This value shall be stored in a shielded location protected from unauthorized use and disclosure.
- (h) The HBRT shall provide capabilities to allow itself to be part of an attestation function.

Note: OEM shall submit an undertaking along with Explanatory Note

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012 V3.1.1 (2017-01) Sec 5.1]

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### 3.8.6 Trusted computing technologies *Securing Networks*

Requirement:

Silicon-based security functionality (for example Intel TXT, SGX, AMD SEV or ARM Trust zone) shall be implemented with a TPM that stores measurements of the entire hypervisor or CIS stack and boot process to provide a trusted hardware platform.

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### 3.8.7 Direct access to memory

Requirement:

The host system shall be able to deny direct access to memory to particular hardware resources.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 012 V3.1.1 section 8.12]

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### 3.8.8 Monitoring of resource usage at both VNF infrastructure (VNFI) and level of guest VNFs

Requirement:

Monitoring shall be put in place at both the infrastructure level and the level of guest VNFs. These two layers will require interfaces with the management & orchestration system to consume monitoring information, then act on it accordingly.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV SEC 001 V1.1.1 (2014-10) clause 6.5.5]

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### 3.8.9 Time Synchronization

Requirement:

Given that token expiration is a component of Identity and Access Management, time synchronization among the servers is critical and hence shall be implemented.

Note: This clause requires IAM for testing. The parameters/features that are required to be configured/enabled for successful testing are to be made available in the system/DUT in fulfillment of this clause.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 002 V1.1.1 Section 5.10]

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### 3.8.10 Lifetime of entities

Requirement:

It is important that the lifetime of Management and Orchestration entities shall be long, relative to the lifetime of entities which they control, such as VNFs, and VNFCIs.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 Section 5.3.2]

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### 3.8.11 Provisioning/Deployment

Requirement:

- (a) Regarding the provisioning of servers, switches, and networking, tools must be used to automate the provisioning eliminating human error.
- (b) The deployment tool is a sensitive component storing critical information (deployment scripts, credentials, etc.).

The following rules must be applied:

- i) The boot of the server or the VM hosting the deployment tool must be protected
- ii) The integrity of the deployment images must be checked, before starting deployment

- iii) The deployment must be done through dedicated network (e.g., VLAN)
- iv) When the deployment is finished, the deployment tool must be turned-off, if the tool is only dedicated to deployment. Otherwise, any access to the deployment tool must be restricted.

[Ref: GSMA NG.133 Cloud Infrastructure Ref Architecture v1.0 Section: 6.3.6.1]

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### 3.8.12 Confidentiality and Integrity of communications

Requirement:

- a) It is essential to secure the infrastructure from external attacks. To counter this threat, API endpoints exposed to external networks shall be protected by either a rate-limiting proxy or web application firewall (WAF), and shall be placed behind a reverse HTTPS proxy.
- b) It shall be ensured that integrity and confidentiality of all network communications (internal and external) by using Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol Ver 1.2 or above.

[Ref: GSMA NG.133 Cloud Infrastructure Ref Architecture v 1.0]

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### 3.8.13 Securing 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Hosting Environments

Requirement:

- a) Sensitive information of virtualized NFs shall be confidentiality protected when using a 3rd party environment (e.g., NFVI).
- b) The system shall be able to monitor the attestation of 3rd party hosting environments.

Note: The parameters/features that are required to be configured/enabled for successful testing are to be made available in the system/DUT in fulfillment of this clause.

[Ref: 1)3GPP 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0 Section 5.21 2) ETSI GS NFV-SEC 010 V1.1.1 (2016-04) Section 6.9 3) ENISA NFV Security in 5G Challenges and Best Practices (February 2022) BP-T29]

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### 3.8.14 Isolation of VM's/Containers (VM and Hypervisor Breakout)

Requirement:

- a) The NFVI shall provide security isolation to minimize the impact of and detect hypervisor/VM breakout on a virtualized 3GPP NF.
- b) The system shall prevent and detect attacks that breakout from an attacked VNF through the virtualization layer to any other VNF or any other location.

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0. Section 5.22]

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### 3.8.15 Backend access Security

Requirement:

The integrity of resources management requests coming from a higher orchestration layer to the Cloud Infrastructure manage shall be validated and verified.

[Ref: GSMA NG 126 Ver 3.0 Section 7.4.2]

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## **Section 3.9: Virtualization Security**

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*(Applicable for any switch which includes Hypervisor/CIS with VM/Container as part of its implementation. Applicable for both Hypervisor based VM with its VNF and CIS based Container with its CNF)*

### **3.9.1 Isolation of VM's (VM and Hypervisor Breakout)**

Requirement:

- a) The NFVI shall provide security isolation to minimize the impact of and detect hypervisor/VM breakout on a virtualized L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch NF.
- b) The system shall prevent and detect attacks that breakout from an attacked VNF through the virtualization layer to any other VNF or any other location.

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0. Section 5.22]

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### **3.9.2 Data synchronicity through network**

Requirement:

The virtualized L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch NFs shall be protected from distributed monitoring attacks. The system shall dynamically assign VNF resources (e.g. memory address) to prevent long-term data leakage and exposure and protect network resources.

[Ref: 3GPP TR 33.848-17.1.0 V.0.11.0. Section 5.25]

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### **3.9.3 Availability**

Requirement:

It shall be possible to replicate virtual machine/ containers into various zones and clusters to achieve high availability.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 002 V1.1.1 Section 9]

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### **3.9.4 Token Generation**



**Requirement:**

The parameters relevant to the token, i.e., lifespan and key length shall be configurable during the token generation.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 002 V1.1.1 Section 5.2.2]

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**3.9.5 Policies for workload placement in Retained data****Requirement:**

Retained Data collection, storage and query shall only take place within the country. An undertaking in this regard shall be submitted.

[Ref: ETSI GS NFV-SEC 010 V1.1.1 (2016-04) Section 6.5]

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**3.9.6 Validating the Topology of Virtualized Network Functions****Requirement:**

- a) The topology of the Virtualized Network functions needs to be validated to ensure that the connectivity of the whole network, including all its virtualized functions meets its security policy.
- b) It also needs to be verified that any unauthorized connectivity shall not be present and that it cannot be added by any unauthorized party.

[Ref- ETSI GS NFV SEC 001 V1.1.1 (2014-10) clause 6.1.2]

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**3.9.7 Network Address Translation****Requirement:**

Support for the private IP address to communicate with a host on the public network shall be provided.

[Ref- ETSI GS NFV-SEC 002 V1.1.1 Section 8.3]

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## Annexure-I

### Definitions

1. **Anti-Spoofing:** Anti Spoofing is a technique for identifying and dropping packets that have a false source address.
2. **Virtual Extensible LAN(VXLAN)** is a network virtualization technology that encapsulates Layer 2 Ethernet frames within Layer 3 UDP packets, enabling scalable and flexible network overlays across data centers and cloud environments.
3. **Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU)** is a message unit used in the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) to share information between switches.
4. **DHCP Snooping:** Ensures that only authorized DHCP servers provide IP addresses within the network.
5. **Port Security: Block** untrusted MAC addresses and dynamically filter spoofed entries, ensuring only authorized devices can connect.
6. **Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD):** MLD is a protocol used in IPv6 networks to manage and control multicast group memberships. It enables a L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch to identify devices that want to receive specific multicast traffic and ensures that multicast packets are forwarded only to the interfaces where those devices reside.
7. **Private VLAN:** provide isolation within a single VLAN by segregating traffic between devices. This allows controlled communication between designated devices, enhancing security and maintaining segmentation while minimizing broadcast traffic.
8. **CNF:** A CNF is a network function that is designed to be deployed in a cloud-native environment. CNFs are typically containerized and can be deployed on any cloud platform.
9. **VNF:** A VNF is a software implementation of a network function, running on virtualized hardware, that replaces traditional physical network appliances.
10. **Confidential system internal data:** that contains authentication data (i.e. PINs, cryptographic keys, passwords, cookies) as well as system internal data that is not required for systems administration and could be of advantage to attackers (i.e. stack traces in error messages).
11. **Confidentiality:** The state of keeping or being kept secret or private.
12. **Firewall:** A firewall is a network security device that monitors traffic to or from the network.
13. **Hold Down Timer** in a switch is a mechanism used in routing protocols to prevent rapid and unnecessary routing table updates by delaying the advertisement of a route when a link failure is detected, essentially pausing the switch from accepting changes to a route for a specific period until the network appears stable again.
14. **Host path:** In Kubernetes, a host Path volume means mounting a file or a directory from the node's host inside the pod. A Kubernetes host path is one of the volumes supported by Kubernetes.
15. **Host system:** collection of hardware, software and firmware making up the system which executes workloads
16. **Hypervisor:** A software which acts as a bridge in between the Virtual Machines and the Host machine. It converts all the operations from the Virtual Machines so that they will be executable on the Host Machine CPU.

17. **VNFC:** Virtualized Network Function Component functions include dynamic scaling to manage varying loads, efficient allocation of compute, storage, and network resources, fault detection with recovery mechanisms to ensure reliability.
18. **NAT Slipstreaming** is an attack technique that allows attackers to bypass a network's firewall and Network Address Translation (NAT) mechanisms. By exploiting the NAT process, attackers can remotely access TCP/UDP services bound to a victim's machine. This is achieved by tricking the NAT into opening an inbound connection. It tricks the ALG processes to inadvertently create an inbound connection path from the internet to the internal network.
19. **Network Service:** composition of Network Function(s) and/or Network Service(s), defined by its functional and behavioral specification.
20. **Platform:** A computer or hardware device and/or associated operating system, or a virtual environment, on which software can be installed or run.
21. **Pods:** Pods are the isolated environments used to execute 5G network functions in a 5G container centric or hybrid container/virtual network function design and deployment.
22. **Poison Reverse** is a routing protocol technique that prevents loops in computer networks that use distance vector routing protocols.
23. **SDN:** SDN is a network architecture that separates the control plane from the data plane. This allows for more flexible and programmable networks. In the context of Wi-Fi CPE, SDN can be used to centralize the management of multiple Wi-Fi CPE devices, automate the provisioning and configuration of Wi-Fi CPE devices, optimize the performance of the Wi-Fi network.
24. **Sensitive Data:** data that may be used for authentication or may help to identify the user, such as usernames, passwords, PINs, cryptographic keys, IMSIs, IMEIs, MSISDNs, or IP addresses of the UE, as well as files of a system that are needed for the functionality such as firmware images, patches, drivers or kernel modules.
25. **Split horizon** is a network protocol technique that prevents routing loops by stopping a switch from advertising a route back to the interface it was learned from.
26. **TEE:** A Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is an area in memory protected by the processor in a computing device. Hardware ensures confidentiality and integrity of code and data inside a TEE. The code that runs in the TEE is authorized, attested, and verified.
27. **VM Image:** A Virtual Machine Image is a fully configured Virtual Machine used to create a VM for deployment.
28. **VNF Image:** It is a fully configured Network Function which is used to deploy the network function in a virtualized environment.
29. **VNF Package:** VNF Package is a ZIP file including VNFD, software images for VM, and other artifact resources such as scripts and config files
30. **Worker nodes:** Worker nodes within the Kubernetes cluster are used to run containerized applications and handle networking to ensure that traffic between applications across the cluster and from outside of the cluster can be properly facilitated.
31. **Workload:** component of the NFV architecture that is virtualized in the context of a particular deployment

32. **MANO:** Management and Orchestration is a framework for managing and orchestrating Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) and their underlying resources in NFV environments. It consists of three key components: the VNF Manager (VNFM), Virtualized Infrastructure Manager (VIM), and Orchestrator.
33. **VNFM:** Virtualized Network Function Manager manages the lifecycle of Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs), including their deployment, configuration, scaling, and termination in a virtualized environment.
34. **RDMA:** Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) allows direct memory transfers between computers over a network without CPU involvement, reducing latency and improving performance.
35. **EVPN -** Ethernet Virtual Private Network (EVPN) is a BGP-based VPN technology that provides scalable Layer 2 and Layer 3 VPN services with enhanced redundancy, load balancing, and mac-address learning across data centers and service provider networks.
36. **SRv6 -** Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) is a network routing architecture that leverages IPv6 segment identifiers (SIDs) to enable flexible, scalable, and programmable packet forwarding without requiring MPLS.
37. **PoE:** Power over Ethernet (PoE) delivers data and power through a single Ethernet cable, simplifying device installations like IP cameras, APs, and VoIP phones. It's cost-effective, flexible, and eliminates the need for separate power supplies.
38. **NAT -** Network Address Translation (NAT) is a networking technique that modifies IP addresses in packet headers to enable multiple devices to share a single public IP address, improving security and conserving IPv4 addresses.
39. **PAT:** Port Address Translation (PAT) extends NAT by mapping multiple private IPs to a single public IP using unique port numbers, enabling efficient IP address usage and secure internet access for multiple devices.
40. **ROA -** Route Origin Authorization (ROA) is a cryptographic record in RPKI that verifies whether an AS (Autonomous System) is authorized to announce a specific IP prefix, helping prevent BGP hijacking.
41. **MLD Snooping -** MLD Snooping is a network switch feature that monitors IPv6 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) messages to optimize multicast traffic delivery by forwarding it only to interested hosts, reducing unnecessary bandwidth usage.
42. **IGMP -Snooping -** IGMP Snooping is a network switch feature that monitors IGMP messages to control and optimize IPv4 multicast traffic, ensuring it is forwarded only to ports with interested receivers instead of flooding the network.
43. **HBRT -** Hardware-Based Root of Trust (HBRT) is a security mechanism that uses dedicated hardware components to establish a trusted foundation for verifying firmware, software, and system integrity. It ensures secure boot processes and protects against tampering by anchoring trust in immutable hardware.
44. **CNFM:** Cloud-Native Function Manager manages the lifecycle of Cloud-Native Network Functions (CNFs), which are containerized network functions, ensuring their deployment, scaling, and orchestration in cloud-native environments, typically using Kubernetes.

**Annexure-II****Acronyms**

3GPP	3rd Generation Partnership Project
AAA Server	Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Server
ACL	Access Control List
API	Application Programming Interface
AS	Autonomous System
BGP	Border Gateway Protocol
BPDU	Bridge Protocol Data Unit
VXLAN	Virtual Extensible LAN
CIS	Container Infrastructure Service
CISM	Container Infrastructure Service Management
CNF	Cloud-Native Function
CWE	Common Weakness Enumeration
DDOS	Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DPDK	Data Plane Development Kit
EMS	Element Management System
ETSI	European Telecommunications Standards Institute
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FR	Frame Relay
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IAM	Identity and Access Management
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
JWT	JSON Web Token
LD	Listener Discovery
MAC	Media Access Control
EVPN	Ethernet Virtual Private Network
NAPT	Network Address and Port Translation
NAT	Network Address Translation
ND	Neighbor Discovery
NE	Network Element
NFVI	Network Functions Virtualization Infrastructure
NIC	Network Interface Controller/Card
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP	Network Time Protocol


O&M	Operation & Maintenance
OS	Operating System
OSI	Open Systems Interconnection
OSPF	Open Shortest Path First
PAT	Port Address Translation
PTP	Precision Time protocol
RIP	Routing Information Protocol
ROA	Route Origin Authorizations
RPKI	Resource Public Key Infrastructure
RTR	RPKI to Router Protocol
SAML	Security Assertion Markup Language
SDN	Software-Defined Networking
SFTP	Secure File Transfer Protocol
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SR-IOV	Single Root I/O Virtualization
SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
ST	Security Target
STP	Spanning Tree Protocol
TARP	Ticket-based Address Resolution Protocol
TFTP	Trivial File Transfer Protocol
UNI	User Network Interface
VIM	Virtualized Infrastructure Manager
VLAN	Virtual Local Area Network
VM	Virtual Machine
VNF	Virtual Network Function
VRF	Virtual Routing and Forwarding
VRP	Virtual Routing Protocol
SRv6	Segment Routing over IPv6
RDMA	Remote Direct Memory Access
HBRT	Hardware-Based Root of Trust
PoE	Power Over Ethernet
PVLAN	Private VLAN

## Annexure III

### List of Submissions

List of undertakings to be furnished by the OEM for L2 and (or) L3 LAN Switch Security testing submissions.

1. Source code security assurances (against test case 2.3.3)
2. Know malware and backdoor check (against test case 2.3.4)
3. No unused software (against test case 2.3.5)
4. No unsupported components (against test case 2.4.2)
5. Avoidance of Unspecified mode of Access (against test case 2.4.3)
6. Cryptographic Module Security Assurance 2.6.2)
7. Cryptographic Algorithms implementation Security Assurance (against test case 2.6.3)
8. Container image authorization (against test case 3.5.13)
9. Core Hardware -HBRT (against test case 3.8.5)
10. Policies for workload placement in Retained data (against test case 3.9.5)



## Annexure IV

### References

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- 2) 3GPP TR 33.848-0.11.0
- 3) TSDSI RPT T1.3GPP TS 33.818-17.1.0.
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- 5) CIS Password Policy Guide
- 6) ENISA Recommendation “Standardization in support of the cybersecurity certification”, Dec 2019
- 7) ENISA NFV Security in 5G - Challenges and Best Practices (February 2022) BP-T29
- 8) ENISA Security Aspects of Virtualization (Feb 2017) G-07, PG 37, OS-01, OS-02
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- 13) [https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022\\_cwe\\_top25.html](https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2022/2022_cwe_top25.html)
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- 36) GSMA NG 133: GSM Association Non-confidential Official Document NG.133